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Introduction
For years trade liberalization among less developed countries
has been confined to regionally limited arrangements - such
as the CACM, LAFTA, EAC, UDEAC, ECOWAS, ASEAN and the Andean
Pact - and has thus enforced the bias towards neighbourhood
trade between countries which are at the beginning of outward-
looking activities. Consequently the degree of regionalization
in South-South trade during the last twenty years has been high
and rather stable over time: In 1977 still 66 percent of total
South-South trade flows (excluding mineral oils) run intra-
regionally, i.e. within the four major developing regions Latin
America, Africa, Middle East, and other Asia, compared to 73
percent in 1960. During the same period the share of total South-
South exports (again excluding mineral oils) in total world
exports stagnated at a level of 3.3 to 3.5 percent. If regiona-
lization and stagnation are two sides of the same issue and if
the expansion of South-South trade could significantly contribute
to the fulfilment of the industrial targets set under the Lima
Declaration , then attention should be'paid to the few approaches
of inter-regional trade liberalization, which under the old GATT
provisions are only accepted by waivers to the MFN rule. The new
Thanks are due to Dean Spinanger for helpful comments.
UN, Committee for Development Planning, Economic and Social
Council, Supplement No. 6, New York 1978, p. 16.- 2
"framework for the conduct of world trade" initiated by some
developing countries under the leadership of Brazil and con-
cluded in the Tokyo Round, however, incorporates inter-regional
liberalization rounds between developing countries as a permanent
legal component into the future GATT and hence may stimulate
further attempts.
Up to now the GATT preferential trade agreement (GPTA) is -
besides the tripartite agreement between the UAR, Yugoslavia
and India - the only inter-regional agreement which has been
accepted in GATT by a waiver. Since its member countries hold
a substantial share in South-South trade (1976: about 40 percent
of total South-South exports in manufactures) and since it is
open to other developing countries it can be conceived as the
core of a global preferential trade agreement between all less




UNCTAD Conferences since the beginning of the seventies. Its
origin dates back to November 1971 when 16 developing countries
agreed in entering into negotiations on mutual tariff and trade
George Alvares, Maciel, Brazil's Proposals for the Reform of
the GATT System. The World Economy, London, Vol. 1 (1978),
pp. 163-176.
2
For an evaluation of the tripartite agreement see Constantine
Michalopoulos, Expanding Trade among Developing Countries:
The Role of Limited Preferential Arrangements. Journal of
Common Market Studies, Oxford, Vol. 13 (1975), pp. 308-319.
3 Cf. UNCTAD IV, Elements of a Preferential System in Trade
among Developing Countries (item 14 - supporting paper) TD/
192/Supp. 2, Nairobi, May 1976; UNCTAD, Economic Co-Operation
among Developing Countries. Draft Resolution recommended by
Negotiating Group VTII for Adoption by the Conference, TD/L.182,
2 June 1979, p. 6.
Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Greece, India, Israel, Republic of Korea
(South Korea), Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Spain,
Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay and Yugoslavia. See GATT, Basic In-
struments and Selected Documents (BISD), 18th Supplement,
1970/71, p. 11.- 3 -
concessions. For eight of than the Protocoll Relating to Trade
Negotiations entered into force in February 1973; seven
additional participants followed till May 1976. During 1976 and
1978 three other countries either signed the Protocoll ad
referendum (Paraguay) or ratified it (Bangladesh) respectively
2 applied for accession to it (Romania) . The Philippines, one of
the sixteen signatory countries of 1971, did not complete the
ratification procedure until November 1978.
The Tariff Cut Procedures and its Impact on the
Structure of Preferential Trade
The tariff concessions procedure resembles those applicated by
LAFTA and ASEAN: The participating countries mutually offer
and exchange own concession schedules on a "case by case" basis,
where the "value" of the concessions is measured by the importance
of concession items in past trade. The latter implies a bias
towards trade in goods which are complements rather than substi-
tutes to domestic production in the donor countries. This is
because past inter-LDC-trade outside the regional integration
schemes displays a high amount of inter-sectoral specialization
supported by a protection structure which discriminates against
manufactures.
Brazil, India, Israel, Republic of Korea (South Korea), Pakistan,
Spain, Turkey and Yugoslavia. See GAIT, BISD, 23rd Supplement,
1975/76, p. 147 sqq.
2 GATT, BISD, 25th Supplement, 1977/78, p. 163 sqq.
See Bela Balassa, Intra-Industry and the Integration of Developing
Countries in the World Economy. In: Herbert Giersch (Ed.), On the
Economics of Intra-Industry Trade. Symposium 1978, (Tubingen;
J.C.B. Mohr), 1979, pp. 245-270. The GPTA itself provides a proof,
since in 1975 only 9 percent of total preferential trade referred
to the BTN chapters 81-98 (manufactures) although the majority of
the participating countries are semi-industrialized and in some
cases successful suppliers on industrialized markets._ 4 -
The "self-selection case-by-case" principle which has been
adopted by the participants for trade concessions purposes
first enables the exclusion of products where domestic suppliers
have vested interests and second the coverage of products
where only one of the participants serves as the traditional
supplier. The high share of trade in raw materials under the
multilateral GPTA-regime is likely to reflect the intention
of the participants to preserve and improve traditional bi-
lateral trade flows in complementary products rather than to
face domestic manufacturing production with competition from
other less developed countries. Under these conditions,
however, trade expansion only follows the growth of domestic
demand, but does not stimulate trade creation, i.e. the pre-
ference-induced substitution of import-competing domestic
production by GPTA imports.
Another aspect restricts the short-term GPTA trade effects:
Tariff concessions are not always identical with tariff re-
ductions or tariff eliminations but may be implemented also
as a binding promise not to raise the tariff rate on GPTA-items
in future. Chile, Israel, and the Philippines include this
form of concessions in their schedules for some tariff items,
which does not allow for import price incentives in South-
South trade.
The trade flows between India and Brazil illustrate the second
aspect. Brazil traditionally imports shellac from India and
therefore included this raw material in its concession schedule.
Hence, although the concessions apply to all members of the
GPTA, India is the only beneficiary. In 1975 shellac imports
from India covered 75 percent of the total Brazilian imports
under the GPTA.- 5 -
Taken the basis of eleven country concession schedules
table 1 reveals that the preference margin amounts to only
30 percent of the pre-concession tariffs, so that nearly
60 percent of total preferential trade in 1975 had been still
subjected to a post-concession tariff higher than 15 percent.
As a comparison; If the GPTA-^nembers would have applicated
the Swiss "tariff cut formula" which was accepted as a
2
"working hypothesis" in the Tokyo Round and by which high
tariffs are overproportionately reduced, the preference margin
would have been 68.1 pel
percent at the average.
would have been 68.1 percent instead of actually only 29.6
Since within the import tariff schedules of the 11 countries
4
the rates escalate from intermediates to finished goods , a
linear cut of about 30 percent (table 1) does not eliminate the
discrimination of imports in finished goods. Apart from the
preservation of complementary trade, this may also explain the
low share of finished goods in preferential trade.
The eleven reporting countries are Brazil, Chile, Egypt,
Greece, India, Israel, Spain, South Korea, Tunisia, Turkey
and Yugoslavia.
o
The Swiss tariff cut formula is expressed as follows:
where Z is the post-concession rate, x the initial tariff level
and a a constant term. The higher this term, the less is the
tariff reduction margin.
Under the assumption on "a" equal 14 as originally proposed in
the Tokyo Round.
4
This cannot be derived from table 1, as the two-digit BTN dis-
aggregation level does not allow for the separation of raw
materials, intermediates and finished goods. At the four-digit





























Mineral and chemical products,
plastic materials and articles
Rubber-, leather-, paper and
paperboard products
Textiles and textile articles
Footwear, headgear, etc.
Non-metallic mineral products
and precious metal products
Base metals and articles of
base metals
Miscellaneous manufactured goods
of base metal; machinery elec-































Calculated on the basis of the four-digit BTN tariff items in the concession schedules of
b c
eleven reporting countries. - In percent of the pre-concession tariff level. - The
chapters 64 - 67 have not been subject to tariff concessions. - Eleven reporting countries.
Sources: Calculated from: Bundesanstalt fur Aufienhandelsinformation (BfA), Zollinformation,
Zolldienst N 5.4, Koln, April 1972; GATT documents L 4412 / Add. 1, L 4412 (Third
Annual Report to Contracting Parties, 1 and 16 November 1976).- 7 -
In addition a highly disproportionate degree of product
coverage in the individual concession schedules hampers
trade expansion. Countries like South Korea, Brazil, Egypt,
Israel or Mexico, whose industrial capacities could stimu-
late intra-industry specialization with less developed countries
outside bilateral complementarity agreements, originally
offered concessions only for less than 15 tariff items,
among which agricultural and mineral raw materials pre-
dominated. On the other hand the amount of concessions of
the Mediterranean countries Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece
ranged from 50 items (Turkey) to more than 100 items (Greece).
If one regards the latter countries together with Tunisia
and Spain as one (mediterranean) region, the relatively
high number of tariff items in their concession schedules
underlines a tendency towards intra-regional trade in the
GPTA: In 1975 about 60 percent of total preferential trade
were confined to trade between these five countries (tables 2
and 3). Since nearly two-thirds of the intra-regional exchanges
focused on unprocessed food (live animals, fruits), and mineral
raw materials (phosphates), the structural weakness of the
self-selection principle in the GPTA becomes evident: It
basically encourages traditional trade between neighbours,
which would have occurred without concessions anyway. The
stimulation of new inter-regional trade relations between the
participants, however, - the original target of the GPTA -





























































































































































































Source: Calculated from GATT, Committee of Participating Countries. Third Annual Report to Contracting Parties, Documents,L/4412/Add.2,
November 1976.
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Source; Calculated from GATT, Committee of Participating Countries. Third Annual Report to Contracting Parties,
November 1976.
Documents, L/4412/Add.2,- 10 -
Direct Trade Effects of the GPTA
The direct trade effects consist of the above-mentioned trade
creation component and of trade diversion, which denotes the
substitution of imports from rron-GPTA-members (either less
developed countries or developed and socialist countries) by
imports from GPTA-^tiembers. The empirical concept draws on the
usual assumption that a reduction in tariffs leads to a pro-
portional decrease of the domestic price of imports, so that
its trade creation effect in absolute terms can be assessed
by multiplying the change in tariffs by the price elasticity
of demand for the preferential imports and by the amount of
the pre-concession imports. Foreign and domestic supply curves
are assumed to be perfectly elastic.
The estimate of trade diversion is more controversial, since
it requires an information on substitution elasticities
between imports from beneficiaries respectively non-beneficiaries.
A shifting of imports from one country to another, however,
cannot be simply attributed to changes in relative prices,
but may also - and perhaps predominantly - correspond to
changes in tastes, product quality, new institutional ties
or to supply bottlenecks in the former exporting country.
These factors cannot be identified at the usual disaggregation
level of international trade statistics.
A way out of this difficulty has been shown by Baldwin and
Murray who assume that the elasticity of substitution between
imports from beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries is equal to
the substitutability between imports from beneficiaries and
domestic production (trade creation).
See Robert E. Baldwin and Tracy Murray, MFN Tariff Reductions and
Developing Country Trade Benefits under the GSP. The Economic
Journal, Cambridge, Vol. 87 (1978), p. 33.- 11 -
However, if we take the consumer's demand as being more in-
different towards imports from different origin countries than
towards imports and domestically produced goods, it seems to
be more appropriate to assume that the substitutability
between imports from beneficiaries and domestic production
equals that between imports from non-beneficiaries and domestic
production. In this case trade diversion becomes trade creation
weighted by the ratio between imports from non-beneficiaries to
imports from beneficiaries, whereas Baldwin/Murray's weight is
the ratio of imports from non-beneficiaries to domestic production.
In any case the estimates of trade creation and trade diversion
crucially depend on the choice of import demand elasticities.
Since such elasticities were not available for the eleven re-
porting GPTA-members, we transformed the BTN-preferential trade
data into corresponding three-digit-ISIC-items and applied the
"best" estimates of US-import demand elasticities provided by
Stern et al. on this disaggregation level
estimates (table 4) mainly indicate that
2
Stern et al. on this disaggregation level. The results of the
- the trade effects are highly regionally unbalanced because
of the uneven product coverage in the national concession
schedules
See the critique of Baldwin/Murray's assumption by Jaleel Ahmad,
Tokyo Pounds of Trade Negotiations and the Generalised System
of Preferences. The Economic Journal, Cambridge, Vol. 88 (1,978),
pp. 285-295.
2
Robert M. Stern, Jonathan Francis and Brace Schumacher, Price
Elasticities in International Trade. An Annotated Bibliography.




















































































































































































































4-digit BTN-level to the 3-digit ISIC-level.
Estimated by the formula TC = £(M.n-(At./1+t.))
the donor country from the beneficiaries of
tariff rate and 4t the change in the tariff
the MFN tariff rate). The subscript :
where TC is the trade creation
the GPTA, n the import
rate
marks the
country. The estimates have been converted
3-digit ISIC-level.
Estimated by the formula TD = £(Mn.n
imports of the donor
socialist countries.

































































demand elasticity, t the initial MFN
preferential tariff margin which equals
in the tariff schedule of the donor
the ISIC-noraenclature and then aggregated up to the
where TD is the trade diversion and Mn the initial
L i.
country from non-beneficiaries either LDC or developed market economies (DC) plus
Other symbols are the same as under trade ereation. 1973 trade flows have been
level for both trade creation and trade diversion.
taken
Sources: Own estimates.
Basic trade data from: GATT documents L 4412 / Add. 1, L 4412
(Third Annual Report to Contracting Parties, I and 16 November 1976).
Basic data on preferential tariff schedules from: BfA, 7-ollinformation, Zolldienst Ho. 4 April 1972.
Specific tariffs in the Greek, Israeli and Mexican schedules have been converted into ad valorem
tariff rates by means of the 1973 trade statistics:
Republique Hellenique, Office National de Statistique de Grece, Bulletin Mensuel de Statistique du
Commerce Exterieur, Fevrier 1974.
Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, Foreign Trade Statistics, Imports, Vol. 6 (1974).












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Continued ...Table 4 - Estimated Trade Expansion Effects of the GATT Preferential Trade










































































































































































































































- the trade expansion is mainly confined to trade diversion
to the detriment of trade with developed and socialist
countries,
- the tariff preferences could stimulate additional trade among
GPTA-members to an extent of about 10 percent of the initial
trade level,
- this additional trade would cause a shift in the sectoral
composition of GPTA-trade'fran both agricultural goods and
semi-manufactures to manufactures,
- other less developed countries joining the GPTA would not
significantly enhance the preferential trade at the given
extent of concessions.
Besides a broader coverage of concession items a more rigorous
tariff cut would - already at an unchanged number of concession
items - foster the trade effects visibly. If for example the
Swiss tariff cut formula had been applied, additional trade
would have amounted to 21.4 percent of initial trade instead of
actually 9.8 percent. But even this increase of preferential trade
in absolute terms by about #180 million - would only correspond
to 7 percent of total trade between the eleven reporting GPTA-
members plus Pakistan in 1975. Hence, even total trade liberali-
zation in the original items seems to be inferior to a sub-
stantially broader coverage of concession items as far as the
target of trade expansion between the GPTA-members is concerned.
Pakistan has not been included in the estimates, because it
did not provide statistics on its preferential imports, while
being mentioned by the other members as an- exporting country
under GPTA-conditions.- 17 -
Outlook
The effects of the GPTA visible so far lend support to the
view that by mutually offering trade concessions the parti-
cipating members behave like developed countries do in non-
reciprocal trade negotiations with less developed countries:
By applying a complex and time-consuming case-by-case procedure ,
based on the self-selection principle, the donor countries reveal
uncertainty on the effects of trade preferences, especially in
South-South trade, as well as fear that a tariff cut across the
board could substantially reduce the non-traded goods sector
and hence threaten domestic producers. Thus, the higher the
ratio between potential trade and actual trade is - say between
India and Brazil - the more the partners are concerned about
adverse effects for import-competing industries. Since the
actual trade level between the GPTA-members is relatively low,
whereas the potential of trade at least between those partners
being semi-industrialised is high, the reluctance of the
members to enforce the liberalization process outweighs the
pretension that the GPTA could advance to an effective global
preferential trade agreement in semi-manufactures and manufactures
between less developed countries.
An UNCTAD report underlines the severe shortcomings of the GPTA
procedure, whereas the UN-Centre for Development Planning
only stresses the doubling of the GPTA-trade between 1973 and
1975 without referring to its low initial level in relation to
total trade between the participants. See UNCTAD IV, op. cit.,
p. 9. - Centre for Development Planning, Projections and
Policies: Salient Feature of Economic Co-operation among
Developing Countries. Journal of Development Planning, New York,
No. 13 (1978), p. 17.- 18 -
Given the actual membership, GPTA-trade will automatically
shrink in any case when Spain and Greece join the EEC: Their
bilateral trade becomes intra-EEC trade, while their trade with
other GPTA-members will be incorporated either in the various
EEC-association agreements (with Israel, Turkey, Yugoslavia,
and Tunisia for instance) or in the global GSP-scheme of the
EEC. Without the "Mediterranean" component which encompassed
about two-thirds of GPTA-trade in 1975, the importance of this
first global trade agreement among less developed countries,
however, will again be exceeded by the regionally limited
arrangements. One of three UNCTAD priority areas in trade
affairs between developing countries, the establishment of a
global system of trade preferences among developing countries,
is therefore still a pending agenda point for future UNCTAD
conferences.
The other areas adopted by the UNCTAD-Conference in June 1979
in Manila refer to co-operation among state trading organizations
of developing countries and to the establishment of multi-
national marketing enterprises among developing countries.